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IMPLEMENTING AND COMMUNICATING CORPORATE SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY: IMPLICATIONS OF FIRM SIZE AND ORGANIZATIONAL 
COST 
 
ABSTRACT 
In this paper we address two research gaps in the extant Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
literature. The first gap results from a lack of understanding of different patterns of CSR 
engagement with respect to CSR communication and implementation. The second gap 
concerns limited knowledge about the influence of firm size on CSR engagement. We 
develop new theory by looking at variations in implementation and communication costs 
depending on firm size. This allows us to explain the large firm implementation gap (large 
firms are relatively strong in communicating CSR but weaker at implementing it into their 
structures and practices) and vice versa the small firm communication gap (weak 
communication and strong implementation). Our model expands a new theory of CSR 
engagement based on as yet underemphasized firm-level antecedents of CSR, and opens up 
several new avenues for future and in particular comparative research. 
KEYWORDS 
Communication; Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR); Firm Size; Implementation; 
Organizational Costs 
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IMPLEMENTING AND COMMUNICATING CORPORATE SOCIAL 
RESPONSIBILITY: IMPLICATIONS OF FIRM SIZE AND ORGANIZATIONAL 
COST 
 
The corporate social responsibility (CSR) field, in both research and practice, continues to 
advance despite a range of inadequately understood and sometimes contradictory phenomena 
(de Bakker et al., 2005). Thus for example, observable increases in the sophistication of 
socially and environmentally responsible business initiatives occur concurrently with wave 
after wave of corporate scandals, media accusations of unethical behavior and green-washing. 
In this article we develop a more nuanced understanding of CSR engagement which seeks to 
explain some of these incongruities. 
One of the key issues in the CSR debate is the distinction between, colloquially 
speaking, “talking” and “walking” social responsibility in a business context (Ramus & 
Montiel, 2005; Wagner, Lutz, & Weitz, 2009). We understand these elements collectively as 
CSR engagement, encompassing CSR communication (the external reports, claims and 
commitments to act socially responsibly projected at a wider public; e.g. Birth, Illia, Lurati, & 
Zamparini, 2008) and CSR implementation (internal actions, structures and procedures which 
embed CSR in organizational processes; e.g. Aguilera, Rupp, Williams, & Ganapathi, 2007). 
Channels of CSR communication might include a CSR report, corporate website, public 
relations, advertising or point of purchase information (Du, Bhattacharya, & Sen, 2010: 11). 
CSR implementation might include the establishment of supply chain monitoring schemes, 
employee safety training, environmental certifications or the inclusion of stakeholders in 
decision-making (e.g., Baumann-Pauly & Scherer, 2012). Increasingly, however, we see an 
acknowledgement of the limited claims that can be made on the basis of CSR communication 
about actual implementation. In an influential Harvard Business Review article Porter and 
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Kramer (2006: 80) propose that “the most common response has been neither strategic nor 
operational, but cosmetic”. It could be argued that we are witnessing an “implementation turn” 
in CSR practice and research. Therein, the focus lies on investigating the presumed 
(mis)match between internal CSR implementation and external CSR communication (e.g., 
Lindgreen, Swaen, & Maon, 2009; Lyon & Maxwell, 2011). 
The second important issue is the distinction between organizations of different size. 
Many studies on CSR do not sufficiently take into account size-related distinctions in how 
firms engage in CSR (e.g., Aguilera et al., 2007; Campbell, 2007; Scherer & Palazzo, 2007). 
The large firm perspective – which accounts for the vast majority of research and public 
attention – is implicitly and sometimes explicitly assumed to apply to all organizational types 
(see e.g., Mackey, Mackey & Barney, 2007). Refuting the appropriateness of this, however, is 
a growing number of studies on smaller firms (usually accounting for over 95% of business 
types in developed and developing economies alike; see Wymenga, Spanikova, Barker, 
Konings, & Canton, 2012)i. Small firms clearly show a difference in CSR engagement 
(Lepoutre & Heene, 2006), as they usually approach CSR based on informal responses and 
follow implicit behavioral guiding principles (Jenkins, 2004). 
In bringing these two issues of the CSR debate together, our research objective is to 
theorize how the organizational implications of firm size can explain differences between 
implementing and communicating CSR. We believe that this lays the foundation for a new 
theoretical explanation of CSR engagement, and introduces several novel avenues for 
research. We start from the position that extant literature often assumes that larger firms such 
as multinational corporations (MNCs) are better positioned in implementing CSR (e.g., 
Elsayed, 2006; McWilliams & Siegel, 2001; Perrini, Russo, & Tencati, 2007; Udayasankar, 
2008). However, studies that scrutinize the integration of CSR in corporate practices show 
that while many large firms display patterns of extensive public CSR communication (e.g., 
6/46 
Birth et al., 2008; Castello & Lozano, 2011; Du et al., 2010), actual implementation lags 
behind (e.g., Baumann-Pauly, Wickert, Scherer & Spence, 2013; Christmann & Taylor, 2006; 
Lyon & Maxwell, 2011). Smaller firms, in contrast, are challenged by a lack of resources 
such as human- or financial capital and economies of scale, as well as low public expectations 
to engage in CSR (Lepoutre & Heene, 2006; Spence, 2007). From an external perspective, 
relatively little is known about CSR in small firms, as their activities are seldom published in 
lengthy sustainability reports, websites, or publicly visible commitments (Matten & Moon, 
2008; Nielsen & Thomsen, 2009). A number of studies do however show that many small 
firms which engage in CSR do so by “silently” implementing a wide range of practices, 
structures, and procedures to uphold social and environmental responsibility in their core 
business operations and supply chains (e.g., Jorgensen & Knudsen, 2006; Murillo & Lozano, 
2006; Pedersen, 2009; von Weltzien Høivik & Melé, 2009). 
We suggest that these popularly observable differences in CSR engagement between 
smaller and larger firms apply for the majority of business firms, even though there may be 
deviations from the stylized case. Yet, the literature lacks a theoretical explanation for the 
large firms’ tendency to be strong in communicating CSR and at the same time weak in 
implementing CSR, contrasted to the smaller firms’ tendency to be strong in implementing 
CSR and weak in communicating CSR. We address these shortcomings by presenting an 
integrated model of size related antecedents of CSR at the firm level of analysis. In a nutshell, 
we propose that relative size dependent organizational costs – including the total money, time 
and other resources associated with CSR engagement – can explain the illustrated differences 
in the patterns of CSR engagement between smaller and larger firms. We propose that large 
firms have beneficial organizational characteristics that make centrally organized activities 
such as externally communicating CSR relatively less costly. In contrast, small firms have 
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beneficial organizational characteristics that make decentrally organized activities such as 
internally implementing CSR relatively less costly, and vice versa. 
The paper proceeds as follows: Departing from extant theories of CSR and the 
limitations of existing accounts to explain size-related differences in CSR engagement, we 
sketch three contributions of our study. Subsequently, we review the literature on firm size 
and organizational costs, which allows identifying size dependent organizational 
characteristics that influence the organizational costs for implementing versus communicating 
CSR. We present a new theory that helps explain the large firm CSR implementation gap and 
the small firm CSR communication gap in the patterns of CSR engagement. We end with a 
discussion of implications for theory as well as comparative and size-aware research on CSR. 
 
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY ENGAGEMENT 
Existing studies that seek to explain why firms engage in CSR can be classified into three 
broad, but not mutually exclusive motives (Aguilera et al., 2007; Basu & Palazzo, 2008). First, 
the economic perspective argues that CSR is driven by instrumental motives, and that firms 
engage in CSR because they attempt to obtain financial benefits or increase competitiveness 
(e.g., Husted & Salazar, 2006; Mackey et al., 2007; McWilliams, Siegel, & Wright, 2006). 
Second, the relational perspective argues that CSR is driven by external demands. For 
instance, firms respond to stakeholder expectations (Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997), engage 
in activities that are considered socially acceptable or legitimate (Campbell, 2007), or follow 
trends that take place on the field level, such as increasing standardization of CSR (Haack, 
Schoeneborn, & Wickert, 2012). Also, CSR-related behavior has been explained by different 
socio-cultural influences (Matten & Moon, 2008) as well as by the nature of ownership of an 
organization (Berrone, Cruz, Gomez-Mejia, & Larraza-Kintana, 2010). Third, the ethical 
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perspective argues that CSR behavior can be explained by ethical considerations of 
individuals within an organization (Donaldson & Dunfee, 1994; Jones, 1991).  
With regards to the firm size related differences in patterns of CSR engagement and 
the intensified critique of what is perceived as hypocritical firm behavior or decoupling of 
CSR communication from implementation, these explanations have three important 
limitations. First, existing studies tend to focus on explaining why firms do or do not engage 
in CSR in the first place. However, this underemphasizes differences in behavioral patterns of 
engagement such as either strong internal implementation or strong external communication 
(see critically: McWilliams & Siegel, 2001; Udayasankar, 2008). Consequently, it has been 
suggested that more attention should be given to explaining variation in different “degrees of 
CSR seriousness” (Aguilera et al., 2007: 855). We propose that “serious CSR” implies 
engagement. This means an integrated approach to internal implementation of CSR in 
practices, structures, and procedures on the one hand and external communication that 
corresponds to what is actually being done on the other (see Baumann-Pauly & Scherer, 
2012). Second, existing literature remains incomplete in linking these differences to the 
influence of firm size, as most studies investigate CSR in small or large firms separately (for 
a recent notable exception analyzing size-related differences in stakeholder pressures and 
environmental responsibility, see Darnall, Henriques, & Sadorsky, 2010). Third, the 
literature’s tendency to base explanations for CSR engagement on the presumed benefits of 
CSR, in particular increased financial performance (see Orlitzky, 2011), neglects the 
significance of the costs of CSR engagement. This view underemphasizes how size-specific 
organizational characteristics influence the relative costs of centralized (external CSR 
communication) versus decentralized administrative tasks (internal CSR implementation). 
However, engaging in CSR incurs tangible costs on business firms in the form of time, labor, 
and assets that are necessary to implement CSR in organizational practices as well as to 
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communicate about activities. Even if a firm does not engage in CSR in either respect it may 
suffer costs in the form of loss of reputation.  
Therefore, many business firms invest in the communication of their CSR policies by 
way of reports, brochures, or websites to create a positive image and to give the impression of 
meeting societal expectations. At the same time, however, they may try to avoid the costs of 
actual CSR implementation. In order to implement CSR within their organizational practices, 
structures, and procedures, companies are expected to rearrange their value chains (e.g. stop 
sourcing from factories with low working standards or child labor), change their product 
technologies or production processes (e.g. avoid toxic substances, employ green technologies), 
or spend resources on public policy issues (e.g. invest in public education, public health, or 
infrastructure) with potentially far reaching cost implications (Scherer, Palazzo, & Seidl, 
2013). Our core argument is thus that conceptualizing the varying costs of CSR engagement 
is a more adequate means to explain differences in firm behavior, that not only acknowledges 
differences in firm size, but equally considers differences between communication and 
implementation of CSR. 
In addressing these limitations, we contribute to the literature by developing a 
theoretical explanation for different firm size dependent patterns of CSR engagement. Our 
conceptualization is based on insights from classic studies of organizational form and the 
argument that firms have a range of organizational characteristics that are influenced 
significantly by their size. These characteristics include the levels of horizontal and vertical 
differentiation, formalization, and specialization, which increase as firm size increases 
(Kimberly, 1976), in addition to the degree of organizational identity consistency, which 
decreases as firm size increases (Kogut & Zander, 1996). In turn, these organizational 
characteristics influence the level of control that managers have over the organization (Downs, 
1966; Williamson, 1967), and the resulting costs of internal coordination and communication 
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(Blau, 1970; Klatzsky, 1970). These organizational features imply different amounts of 
organizational costs for communicating or implementing CSR in small versus large firms. 
Firm-size dependent organizational costs of internal CSR implementation vs. external 
communication make the administration of one pattern relative to the other more or less 
favorable for a firm and thus may explain the observed stronger salience of that pattern in 
smaller vs. larger firms. 
Our study makes three contributions to the CSR literature. First, we develop a cost-
based model of firm-level antecedents of CSR that explains why larger firms tend to be 
stronger communicators of CSR, while smaller firms tend to be stronger implementers of 
CSR. As such, we expand the prevailing narrow perspective on CSR that overlooks important 
disparities between internal implementation and external communication. In light of 
increasing corporate scandals and allegations of corporate green-washing, this distinction is 
critical to develop more solid explanations of firm behavior. In particular, the cost-based 
antecedents of CSR engagement that we propose add to explanations that have analyzed 
decoupling in the realm of CSR, but have thus far focused on institutional determinants 
(Crilly, Zollo, & Hansen, 2012; Lim & Tsutsui, 2012). Second, we develop a theoretical basis 
for as yet underemphasized size-aware research in CSR at the organizational level of analysis 
that provides a comparative perspective between smaller and larger firms. This is an 
important direction for future research that seeks to better understand why small and large 
firms engage in CSR differently, while also acknowledging the contribution of small firms in 
tackling questions of social and environmental responsibility (Darnall et al., 2010; Russo & 
Perrini, 2010). Third, by connecting the broad literatures on organizational costs and CSR, we 
offer a novel perspective to explain variation in patterns of CSR outcomes (e.g., Aguinis & 
Glavas, 2012; Basu & Palazzo, 2008). Rather than looking at the assumed benefits or 
consequences of CSR as an independent variable, we will argue why an implementation and 
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communication cost based analysis is well suited to examine varying forms of CSR 
engagement. Figure 1 provides an upfront overview of our causal argumentation. 
 
------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
FIRM SIZE AND ORGANIZATIONAL COSTS 
The relationship between firm size, characteristics of organizational form and respective 
implications on organizational costs is well established (amongst others, see Blau, 1970; 
Child, 1973; Downs, 1966; Hsu, Marsh, & Mannari, 1983; Kimberly, 1976; Klatzsky, 1970; 
Pondy, 1969; Williamson, 1967). This debate has, however, as yet received little attention in 
the CSR literature. There is a strong consensus that firm size as one of many variables that 
define organizational characteristics, for instance technology, environment or ownership, is 
perhaps the most pervasive in terms of the number of suggested relationships with other 
organizational features (e.g., Child, 1973; Child & Mansfield, 1972; Hsu et al., 1983). 
Accordingly, other central structural attributes that characterize organizations are critically 
influenced by firm size. Nevertheless, “[i]f one is concerned with understanding the structural 
configuration of organizations, size alone, […], does not explain much of anything” 
(Kimberly, 1976: 590), but needs to be seen in relation to other factors, as we will illustrate 
below. More specifically, organizations have a number of central and what we call “primary” 
organizational characteristics. Particular significance is attributed to the extent of horizontal 
and vertical differentiation, specialization and formalization, in addition to the degree of 
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identity consistency (Blau, 1970; Child, 1973; Hsu et al., 1983; Kimberly, 1976; Kogut & 
Zander, 1996).  
1) Horizontal differentiation is the number of departments or sub-units that exist 
within a single organization (Blau, 1970). This includes the various “productive” and usually 
decentralized departments of a corporation like logistics, operations, production and sales, as 
well as centralized overhead functions like human resources, finance and accounting and also 
for instance a CSR department as is increasingly common in large MNCs. Large firms usually 
have complex organizational charts which depict extensive horizontal differentiation, while in 
small firms, a department may comprise a small number of employees, or a single employee 
may cover several functions.  
2) Vertical differentiation is the number of ranks or levels of authority, in other words 
hierarchy, that exist within a single organization (Hsu et al., 1983). In large firms, there are 
naturally a high number of ranks, with the president or CEO being far removed from the 
lowest ranked employee. In smaller firms, there is often a flat hierarchy where owner-
managers have a small physical as well as emotional distance from their employees and are 
subject to the influences and constraints of proximity (Jones, 1991). Thus many large firms 
have a CSR director located close to the board level in the headquarters but far away from 
productive departments. In small firms, social or environmental responsibility is often 
overseen by the owner-manager or directly administered by line managers, both being close to 
the actual production process (Fassin, 2008).  
3) Functional specialization is defined as the extent to which administrative 
organizational functions are assigned as specialized duties to individuals (Child & Mansfield, 
1972). In large firms, employees are generally very focused on their particular job function, 
such as being solely responsible for CSR reporting and external communication. Such 
specialized jobs tend to require a specific set of skills with limited overlap with administrative 
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functions responsible for implementing CSR-related practices (making moves between 
productive departments and a CSR department difficult). In smaller firms, individuals are 
more likely to be responsible for a broader and less specialized set of tasks, requiring them to 
multi-task, take on diverse roles, and respond to current imperatives as a matter of necessity 
(Heneman, Tansky, & Camp, 2000). However, this implies that in small firms people are 
more likely to have good knowledge about the overall set of tasks handled within the firm, 
including those related to CSR.  
4) Formalization denotes the extent to which rules, procedures, instructions, and 
communications are made explicit and written down and the extent of their application to the 
execution of procedures and conveyance of information (Child & Mansfield, 1972; Hsu et al., 
1983). In large firms, a very high number of procedures, i.e. the way certain activities should 
be handled, are formally recorded in bureaucratic documents, policies or manuals thereby 
passing on knowledge and expected practice (Kimberly, 1976). This includes directives on 
how to handle CSR-related issues, such as a human rights policy, compliance guidelines for 
fraud and bribery prevention, or standardized management schemes to ensure environmental 
protection. In smaller firms as we have noted, such knowledge tends to be more tacit and 
informal, i.e. it is conveyed to new employees through the organizational culture, by personal 
example and verbal communication as “the way things are done” in that firm (Thorpe, Holt, 
Macpherson, & Pittaway, 2005). 
5) Identity consistency refers to an adherence to often unconscious and symbolic 
coding of values and rules, which ensures the consistent and informal handling of daily 
business processes by employees (Kogut & Zander, 1996). This shared identity establishes 
and facilitates the sharing of explicit and tacit rules of coordination within the firm (Ouchi, 
1979). In small businesses with fewer employees, the organizational identity, that is, the 
perception of “who we are” as an organization is usually comprised of relatively homogenous 
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interests compared with larger firms. The presumably higher commitment to the 
organization’s objectives in smaller firms reduces the need for costly internal surveillance and 
auditing, compared with larger firms. 
We conclude from this brief review that primary organizational characteristics differ 
significantly depending on firm size: Horizontal differentiation, vertical differentiation and 
specialization and formalization tend to be higher the larger an organization is, while identity 
consistency tends to be higher in smaller organizations. These primary characteristics need to 
be administered by the organization, thus evoking what we call central “secondary” 
characteristics or administrative tasks, which imply different kinds of organizational costs for 
those tasks that are centrally organized – externally communicating CSR – versus those tasks 
that are decentrally organized – internally implementing CSR.  
The literature suggests that increasing firm size is associated with increases in 
problems in particular of control, coordination and communication (Blau, 1970; Downs, 1966; 
Kimberly, 1976; Klatzsky, 1970). These features influence the magnitude of the 
administrative component of an organization and the span of control of managers or 
supervisors. Correspondingly, increases in complexity or differentiation exacerbate the 
severity of adequate administration in the form of control and coordination as well as higher 
costs for internally communicating the CSR agenda to employees. In general, larger and more 
highly differentiated organizations have a relatively larger administrative component than 
smaller firms (Kimberly, 1976). Table 1 summarizes the cost implications of the primary and 
secondary organizational characteristics of small and large firms. 
 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
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------------------------------- 
 
In the following, we outline the cost implications of the key administrative tasks, control, 
coordination and communication, in relation to firm size. This allows to show how these tasks 
have different organizational costs for CSR engagement, in terms of implementing and 
communicating CSR, in small and large firms respectively. 
CONTROL AND CSR ENGAGEMENT 
According to the “Law of Diminishing Control”, the larger an organization becomes, the 
weaker the control those at the top have over its actions (Downs, 1966: 109). Thus, to 
influence what people far away from the headquarters practice becomes increasingly difficult. 
Administrative tasks that are centrally organized, in other words managed by or close to the 
headquarters of a large organization like the development of a CSR strategy by the CSR 
department, need to trickle down in the organization to decentralized divisions where the 
actual production or value creation processes take place (Blau, 1970). This includes the firm’s 
own sites and is increasingly expected to also reach out to a firm’s suppliers’ sites (Scherer & 
Palazzo, 2011). Pfeffer (1978: 37) argued that in large and usually highly diversified 
businesses, due to their sheer magnitude of functionally different and very specialized jobs, 
“few participants are constantly involved or care about every dimension of the organization’s 
operations”. Furthermore, the naturally limited oversight capacity of managers at the top of 
organizations implies that increasing size will inevitably lead to a loss of control over 
departments or sub-divisions (Simon, 1997; Williamson, 1967). In what has been described as 
the “rumor-transmission-process” (Bartlett, 1932), information that is transmitted across 
successive hierarchical levels becomes distorted the more often it is reproduced.  
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This loss in information quality and consistency needs to be compensated by costly 
control devices such as supervision, redundancy, reorganization, or overlapping areas of 
responsibility. For CSR departments in larger firms, it is thus relatively costly to apply control 
devices that help to ensure that the CSR-related policies and guidelines are understood and 
implemented in organizational practices by the functional departments of the organization. 
For example, large firms are increasingly pressured by civil society actors to extend their CSR 
activities not only to subsidiaries in different countries but also to their supply chains (Scherer 
& Palazzo, 2007; Spence & Bourlakis, 2009). Controlling the implementation of CSR 
standards to which the firm has publicly committed, however, is very costly given that large 
firms usually have several thousand suppliers across the globe and often switch suppliers 
depending on price (see Kostova & Roth, 2002). As a result, such costly control processes 
invariably result in diminishing returns and thus evoke increasing cost of administration the 
larger an organization becomes. Ouchi (1979) adds that control modes which heavily depend 
on explicit and formalized monitoring, evaluating, and correcting – practices that are common 
in many large firms – are more “likely to offend people’s sense of autonomy […] and will 
probably result in an unenthusiastic, purely compliant response”. In the context of CSR, 
achieving compliance with existing laws or social norms is however often problematic, and 
instead a proactive and forward-looking stance of the involved employees is required. 
In contrast, for the usually owner-managed smaller firms, Pondy (1969) suggests that 
it is more likely that owner-managers are unwilling to dilute their personal discretionary 
power and control over the organization and refrain from adding layers of hierarchy or 
administration. This makes control over the different tasks handled by a small firm relatively 
less costly. For instance, a small firm owner-manager who is committed to CSR would most 
likely take the personal responsibility for implementation. In addition, smaller firms have less 
difficulty controlling conformity to expected socially responsible behavior among their 
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employees with which the owner-manager usually has personal and long-term relationships 
based on mutual reliance and trust (Spence, 2004; Spence, Schmidpeter, & Habisch, 2003). 
Putnam (1993) for instance suggests that high levels of trust diminish the probability of 
opportunism and reduce the need for costly monitoring processes.  
Whether implementing CSR really pays, leading to increased share prices remains 
unclear. In other words, there is no consensus in the literature about a clearly positive 
relationship between CSR implementation and financial performance (Orlitzky, 2011; Peloza, 
2009; Peloza & Shang, 2011). However, comprehensively implementing CSR in the 
organizational processes of large firms involves formulating policies and procedures, 
providing specific CSR training to several thousand employees, and ensuring the consistent 
application of CSR standards at all organizational levels and divisions (Baumann-Pauly & 
Scherer, 2012). This corresponds to McWilliams and Siegel’s (2001) argument that 
economies of scope accrue in the joint provision of CSR attributes over many different 
products. In other words, large and highly diversified firms can generate cost savings if their 
CSR communication is attributed to a high number of products or services. For example, “the 
goodwill generated from firm-level CSR-related advertising can be leveraged across a variety 
of the firm’s brands” (McWilliams & Siegel, 2001: 123), implying lower average costs for 
CSR communication for larger firms. In contrast, in order to implement CSR in large firms, a 
very high number of operational practices and procedures would have to be adjusted. Given 
that large firms are usually more diversified than small firms (see McWilliams & Siegel, 
2001), CSR-related practices such as environmentally friendly product ingredients would also 
have to be adapted to specific requirements that are more complex the larger product 
portfolios become, implying additional implementation costs.  
Similarly, as business firms are increasingly expected to conform to stakeholder 
expectations, the development of stable stakeholder relations where joint norms, values and 
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strategies need to be discursively exchanged is challenging and costly for large firms. Firms 
with global supply chains and production networks are simultaneously facing legitimate and 
diverging stakeholder interests at a global level, both internally, e.g. their employees in 
subsidiaries, and externally, e.g. the communities in which they operate. In addition to these 
organizational challenges, a history of negative experiences with external stakeholders paired 
with the self-confident image portrayed by large firms often represents a major obstacle for 
the systematic integration of external stakeholders’ concerns in the implementation process of 
CSR (Baumann-Pauly & Scherer, 2012). Additionally, non-governmental organizations often 
focus on high impact and well-known brand names of large firms that attract public attention 
(Doh & Guay, 2006). In order to change the “naming and shaming” game and constructively 
cooperate with these critical stakeholders, trust needs to be restored by cost-intensive 
stakeholder dialogues or other exchange platforms. In contrast, for small firms that also 
increasingly possess global supply chains, their number of stakeholders is usually limited to a 
few key parties. For instance, small firms often keep the number of their suppliers low, and 
they are selected based on long-term relationships characterized by honesty and mutual trust, 
avoiding expensive switching and screening costs (Pedersen, 2009; Spence, 2007). In sum, we 
conclude that decentralized control practices and procedures, such as CSR implementation, 
are relatively costly for large firms, and relatively less costly for smaller firms. 
 
 
 
COORDINATION, INTERNAL COMMUNICATION AND CSR ENGAGEMENT  
As large size implies increasing administrative overhead, it hence also increases the costs of 
internally coordinating and communicating the different activities of a firm, not only the 
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internal implementation of CSR, but also ensuring consistency between implementation and 
external communication. Once specialized departments have been established, the cost of 
administrative overhead decreases with organizational size, thanks to economies of scale in 
administration. Blau (1970) has in this regard suggested a U-shaped cost-curve of 
administration, while others have argued for a curvilinear expansion of coordination costs – 
the percentage of administrative staff increases with size up to a given point, and then 
stabilizes (Klatzsky, 1970). Nevertheless, complexity and organizational differentiation also 
lead to increases in administrative coordination costs, which particularly apply to 
contemporary multinational large firms that operate across countries and cultures. Becker and 
Murphy (1992) elaborate further on the role of coordination cost and argue that the costs of 
coordinating specialized workers, as well as the amount of knowledge that is necessary for the 
production process to work efficiently, are critically influenced by the degree of specialization 
of an organization. Thus, these costs are higher in larger, more functionally specialized firms. 
Specialization is said to increase until the higher productivity from a greater division of labor 
is balanced by the additional marginal costs of coordinating a larger number of more 
specialized workers (Becker and Murphy, 1992). Nevertheless, the larger an organization is, 
the larger the number of people that would remain inactive during some part of the production 
period, and the larger would be the indirect coordination costs (Camancho, 1991). 
Coordination and communication costs, however, are lower if the organization has a 
highly uniform identity or has a high goal consistency, as there is a lower need to control for 
behavior that might deviate from central organizational objectives (Williamson, 1967). A 
sense of community or “family” – a commonly accurate description or metaphor for many 
small firms given the prevalence of family businesses and frequency of personal interactions 
between senior- and middle management as well as line-employees – can facilitate 
coordination and mutual understanding (Thorpe et al., 2005). Thus coordination and 
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communication costs are less for small firms than for large organizations with greater degrees 
of individual specialization and highly inconsistent goals across the organization.  
There is also an issue around shared language. Ouchi (1979) suggests that in many 
large corporations, departments tend to develop their own particular jargon that is suited to 
the specific task needs of that department. This helps to balance the limited information-
carrying capacity of an organization. At the same time, highly specialized and functional 
language increases the communication barriers in large organizations for instance if function-
specific jargon used by the CSR-department (perhaps including terminology such as 
citizenship, integrity, trust, stakeholders, stakeholder dialogue, sustainability, ethics) is to be 
transmitted and translated meaningfully throughout the organization. Firms with strong 
corporate cultures or firms that put an emphasis on identity building may be able to offset 
some of the coordination costs that accrue when rolling out a CSR program. In general, 
however, internal communication becomes increasingly complex and costly to administer the 
larger the organization is. 
In small firms, the typically informal communication style, fewer hierarchical levels 
and low levels of bureaucracy most likely keep the internal coordination and communication 
costs for implementing CSR in organizational processes relatively lower than in larger firms. 
Blau (1970) for instance argued that social contacts and interaction with persons outside one’s 
own direct specialization, i.e. a functional department, are more common in smaller 
organizations, where such departments might not formally exist. Social or environmental 
concerns that emerge from productive activities may therefore be more directly conveyed 
from owner-managers to employees, and vice versa, making it “easier for the concerns of 
ordinary workers to be heard” (Darnall et al., 2010: 1077). 
In contrast, in large firms, managers at the top of an organization, i.e. those that are 
usually responsible for developing policies such as a CSR agenda, must reach out and literally 
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“persuade” a myriad of employees in functional positions that may have highly divergent 
interests in relation to the organization’s overall objectives. Thus, as opposed to external 
communication to stakeholders, internally communicating the components of a CSR program 
to raise awareness, in particular information about the nature of the adequate “responsible” 
organizational practices, structures, and procedures from the top to the bottom of an 
organization becomes increasingly costly the larger an organization is. 
Evidence of the relatively strong development of external communication of CSR in 
large firms supports our argument (Gamerschlag, Möller, & Verbeeten, 2011). Given the 
higher visibility of most large firms and the increasing pressure of external stakeholders to 
make their CSR engagement more transparent, the improvement of CSR reporting has 
become a priority for many large firms (Castello & Lozano, 2011; Du et al., 2010). Indeed, 
empirical results show that voluntary CSR reporting decreases the cost of equity capital for 
publicly traded firms that are under greater media and investor scrutiny (Dhaliwal, Li, Tsang, 
& Yang, 2011; Reverte, 2012). Large firms, however, can relatively easily construct a CSR-
façade by establishing a CSR department that handles PR-requests and is responsible for 
formally reporting CSR activities in a representative manner. For instance, many large firms 
promote their participation in the United Nations Global Compact or they align their reporting 
to sophisticated international guidelines such as the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI). 
Assuming that the establishment of a CSR department involves some initial cost and human 
resources but then remains relatively constant, its proportionate size and relative cost declines 
the larger a firm becomes.  
For smaller firms, in contrast, externally communicating their CSR engagement to the 
public by following formal guidelines or standards is relatively costly. However, given the 
small number of employees and flat hierarchies, information can more easily be shared and 
discussed in informal settings across the organization. Because of close moral proximity, the 
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influence of the leader(s) is probably still more significant in small firms than in large firms, 
meaning that employees can directly interact with CSR role models, such as owner-managers 
(Courrent & Gundolf, 2009). Often, small-firm owner-managers choose to implement 
responsible business practices out of conviction and at their own discretion (Jenkins, 2004). 
They tend to emphasize so-called “socio-emotional wealth”, rather than material wealth – in 
contrast to profit-maximizing large firms that are under greater shareholder pressure (Berrone 
et al., 2010). In general, owner-managed family-owned firms that are usually smaller in size 
tend to face lower pressure from investors to maximize their returns, giving them more 
legitimacy to devote resources to socially responsible business practices (Quinn, 1997). 
Assuming such an intrinsic motivation to engage in CSR, a mismatch between CSR activity 
and stated intent seems much less likely in particular among owner-managed small firms than 
for public large firms. 
In terms of externally communicating CSR, unlike larger firms, smaller firms tend to 
employ informal, personalized mechanisms. As such, interaction with a selected group of 
stakeholders is done on the basis of face-to-face interaction rather than formal written 
accounts such as annual CSR reports (Spence, 2004). More appropriate for the smaller firm is 
what has been called a “socializing” process of accountability (Roberts, 2001). Therein, CSR 
activities are accounted for by day-to-day interaction, lateral exchange and two-way 
communication with suppliers, employees or customers, and are characterized by a high 
moral intensity (Courrent & Gundolf, 2009). This offers small firms the opportunity for a full 
reciprocal discussion and development of embedded personal recognition and identity 
(Spence, 2004). In larger firms, stakeholder communication and accountability is more likely 
a one-way communication of written reports published by a large firm and then sent to 
interested parties, without directly addressing them personally (Roberts, 2001). We suggest 
that the small firm socializing forms of accountability make a gap between CSR 
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communication and corresponding organizational implementation less likely. Furthermore, as 
the majority of smaller firms are not publicly listed, the common lack of requirements to 
compile standardized financial reports means that the systems and processes of external 
communication are largely unfamiliar. 
Meeting the increasingly demanding formal reporting requirements for CSR, such as 
structuring a report along the extensive GRI performance indicators, appears to be more 
complicated for many smaller firms (GRI, 2011). Commonly expected quality standards for 
CSR reports have expanded, and for smaller firms a relatively high and even prohibitive share 
of resources is required to draft a “high-gloss” report, a website, or to pay membership fees of 
a CSR initiative such as the United Nations Global Compact (see Fassin, 2008). In addition, 
due to their low visibility and the absence of media attention, and thus limited readership, it is 
unlikely that small firms would see a significant benefit in a publicity-driven approach to CSR, 
in contrast to most large firms. Thus, the motivation to direct financial and human resources 
in costly but largely unnoticed reporting is comparably limited.  
Furthermore, given the earlier discussion on intrinsic motivation of owner-managed 
smaller firms to implement CSR, there is unlikely to be a desire for replacing authentic CSR 
implementation with what may be perceived as a de-personalized branding exercise (Nielsen 
& Thomsen, 2009). Importantly, engaging with external stakeholders by working in more 
(formal or informal) partnerships and including them in decision-making processes about the 
adequate implementation of CSR issues is a relatively common practice for smaller firms 
(Spence, 2007). In general, smaller firms tend not to have the resources to continuously 
generate knowledge about the increasingly complex issue of CSR and therefore need input 
and guidance from external stakeholders to manage such processes (Spence et al., 2003). 
Given the much lower public visibility of small firms in contrast to well known large firms, in 
particular MNCs, the former tend to be less exposed to NGO criticism and accordingly, the 
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CSR implementation strategy of small firms is typically a cooperative one in which they draw 
on their social capital (Russo & Perrini, 2010). 
Our understanding of the differences in CSR communication in small and large firms 
also corresponds with recent research on the influence of CSR on corporate image 
attractiveness, company-stakeholder identification, and organizational performance and the 
moderating effects of firm size, industry type, and marketing budgets (Arendt & Brettel, 
2010). It is argued that large firms focus on image building marketing activities and dedicate 
their budgets to external communication. In contrast, smaller firms, in particular in service 
intensive industries, focus on strengthening relationships with their most important 
stakeholders (Spence et al., 2003), such as employees, suppliers or key customers, thus 
focusing their CSR communication on selected parties.  
 
A NEW THEORY OF CSR ENGAGEMENT  
Based on our foregoing theoretical argumentation, we conclude that firm size dependent 
organizational characteristics imply favorable or unfavorable cost implications for externally 
communicating versus internally implementing CSR. This can explain why small firms tend 
to exhibit a high scope of implementation and a low scope of communication while large 
firms tend to exhibit a high scope of communication and a low scope of implementation. We 
coin these patterns the small firm CSR communication gap, and the large firm CSR 
implementation gap. Larger firms have a CSR implementation gap, because internal 
implementation of CSR practices and procedures into core business operations is relatively 
costly in comparison to relatively less costly external public communication of CSR. In 
contrast, smaller firms have a CSR communication gap, because external public 
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communication of CSR is relatively costly in comparison to relatively less costly internal 
implementation of CSR practices and procedures into core business operations. 
Figure 2 schematically illustrates our key arguments. In a simplified manner, the 
horizontal axis depicts the continuum of increasing firm size, where smaller firms are located 
on the left, and larger firms further right on the axis. The vertical axis depicts the relative 
organizational costs of the engagement in CSR defined as the relative share in total firm costs 
of either external CSR communication or internal CSR implementation. Notably, CSR 
communication costs can be best characterized as implying predominantly fixed costs whose 
relative share in total costs declines with growing firm size (see McWilliams & Siegel, 2001). 
More specifically, this includes fixed expenses such as human and financial resources for 
establishing a CSR department, for publishing a report or crafting policy documents, which 
increases the overall cost but then remains relatively constant. In contrast, CSR 
implementation would predominantly imply variable costs, as practices and procedures would 
have to be individually adjusted. Thus, while the share of fixed costs for CSR communication 
would decrease the larger the firm becomes, variable costs for CSR implementation that are 
tied to the number and scope of processes which need to be changed would increase the larger 
the firm becomes. For instance, a large firm needs to provide training about CSR to more 
employees and spend more resources to monitor diversified and geographically distant 
divisions, or it might have to pay higher material costs per unit if sourcing from suppliers that 
have an environmental or social certification (see McWilliams & Siegel, 2001). Variable costs 
also apply for CSR implementation in smaller firms. However, the relatively lower costs for 
control and internal communication and coordination make the administration of CSR 
implementation more favorable for small firms compared to less favorable CSR 
communication. In the graph, the space between the two curves (black/dotted) indicates the 
cost-differentials for the small firm communication gap and the large firm implementation 
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gap, respectively. Notably, in seeking to visualize our theoretical arguments, this simplified 
model does not suggest a specific scale. However, as the graph shows, we argue that the small 
firm gap is most likely lesser than the large firm gap. This is because the “delta”, i.e. 
difference between the relative small firm costs for implementation vs. communication of 
CSR, is comparably lower than the delta for large firms, for which CSR implementation is 
significantly more costly than CSR communication.  
 
------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
------------------------------- 
 
Opportunities for empirical research arise in exploring how these conceptual gaps 
could be measured, and to investigate under which conditions the small firm communication 
gap is likely of smaller scope than the large firm implementation gap; or if very small or 
micro and very large organizations have a respectively larger gap. In the following, we outline 
several implications that extend our theoretical understanding of size-related differences in 
CSR engagement as well as implications for future research. 
 
THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS  
The theoretical implications of our model are an attempt to merge the two key issues in the 
CSR debate that we have sketched above: Observable differences between implementation vs. 
communication of CSR and small vs. large firms. We have argued that smaller firms possess 
beneficial organizational characteristics to implement CSR practices in functional activities, 
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because costs for control, coordination and internal communication are relatively low 
compared to larger firms. At the same time, we have shown that extensive communication 
and reporting is less attractive for smaller firms due to higher relative costs as well as lower 
public pressure. The situation, however, differs significantly for larger firms. They have 
beneficial organizational characteristics that make centralized activities such as 
communicating about CSR activities less costly. Economies of scale in centralized 
administrative overhead functions, including CSR communication, make it relatively cheap 
for large firms to provide extensive commitments and reporting on CSR. In turn, due to 
higher implementation costs (high control, coordination and internal communication), large 
firms may be inclined to decouple CSR communication from functional activities and 
concrete organizational practices integrated in the core business processes of the organization. 
This aspect seems especially pertinent considering that a link between increased CSR 
engagement and financial performance, such as higher share prices, remains unclear (Orlitzky, 
2011; Peloza, 2009; Peloza & Shang, 2011), while at the same time large firms face 
increasing societal pressures, for instance by consumers, to appear socially responsible 
(Wagner et al., 2009).  
Large firms therefore have an incentive to engage in relatively inexpensive symbolic 
or “ceremonial” (Meyer & Rowan, 1977) implementation of CSR practices in order to 
communicate a responsible image to external stakeholders through their reporting function 
and to enhance reputation or attractiveness for investors. In the context of CSR, this behavior 
has often been called “window dressing” (Weaver, Treviño, & Cochran, 1999: 539) or green-
washing (Laufer, 2003), while scholars of political economy have referred to “organized 
hypocrisy” (see Lim & Tsutsui, 2012). Lyon and Maxwell (2011) for example highlight how 
some MNCs conduct symbolic activities to signal their commitments to philanthropy and 
environmentalism and direct stakeholder attention to these activities in order to avoid social 
28/46 
penalties. The authors illustrate how the oil giant BP has attempted to divert attention from its 
environmentally harmful deep water exploration activities towards the company’s relatively 
marginal investments in renewable energy. More generally, it has been widely argued that 
external appearance rather than the fact of conformity between appearance and internal 
practices is often presumed to be sufficient for the attainment of a socially responsible image 
(see e.g., Lim & Tsutsui, 2012; Oliver, 1991). This makes it even more financially attractive 
to engage in inexpensive CSR communication, rather than expensive CSR implementation.  
The large firm implementation gap can thus be seen as a form of decoupling (Meyer & 
Rowan, 1977; Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2008), where symbolic communication about the 
implementation of CSR-related organizational practices does not correspond with the actual 
implementation of these practices. In this sense, our theoretical model introduces an important 
novel perspective to better understand potential organizational level antecedents of 
decoupling, where different conditions of decoupling between smaller and larger firms have 
not as yet been sufficiently developed. While institutional perspectives for instance emphasize 
field-level determinants for decoupling (e.g., Crilly et al., 2012; Kostova & Roth, 2002; Lim 
& Tsutsui, 2012), a consideration of organizational costs can help us clarify the potentially 
significant influence of firm-specific, and in particular cost-related factors that might also 
influence and explain why organizations engage in different degrees of decoupling CSR 
implementation from CSR communication. This also provides an explanation for earlier work 
that has argued that building an external appearance of social responsibility without 
corresponding internal organizational practices should be relatively inexpensive (Christmann 
& Taylor, 2006; Pratt & Foremann, 2000).  
Our perspective on the relative organizational cost of implementing and 
communicating CSR also marks a new theoretical perspective for CSR research in relation to 
small firms. Previously, differences in CSR engagement of small firms predominantly 
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referred to the lack of a profit-maximizing motive where owner-managers have the autonomy 
not to maximize shareholder value (e.g. Quinn, 1997; Jenkins, 2004), but discretion to direct 
resources to socially or environmentally responsible business practices (Berrone et al., 2010). 
It has been argued that small firm owner-managers are not driven by profit maximization, but 
instead by profit-satisficing behavior, along with a range of personal, social and cultural 
motivations (Spence & Rutherfoord, 2001). Hence, researchers and policy-makers seeking to 
promote CSR by focussing on potential profit rewards are ill-judged. Our model suggests that 
rather than linking CSR to profitability, a focus on the link to organizational costs could have 
greater resonance for explaining CSR engagement in small firms.  
In general, we do not assume that our approach is exhaustive in explaining different 
CSR patterns. Rather, it presents an important and yet underemphasized complement to the 
extant picture that includes field-level (e.g., industry, country), and individual level (e.g., 
ethical motivation, managerial sensemaking), with organizational level – such as 
organizational cost – factors to illuminating variation in CSR engagement. Accordingly, we 
suggest as an important implication for future research that taking cost implications more 
explicitly into account seems more effective than focusing on profit-based explanations of 
CSR engagement. Having illustrated the considerable differences between smaller and larger 
firms, our theoretical model opens up several opportunities for future size aware and 
comparative research in CSR.  
 
RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS 
We have presented a theoretical model to understand how organizational costs for internally 
implementing versus externally communicating CSR can explain differences between small 
and large firms. This model helps better understand and explain the empirical evidence that 
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suggests a small firm communication gap and a large firm implementation gap. Our study 
thus marks an important starting point towards the further development of theory that can 
explain variation in CSR engagement and sheds light on size-specific and cost-related 
antecedents that lead to different forms of CSR.  
Our model is based on a static perspective of organizational costs leading to the 
respective communication versus implementation gaps. We therefore consider an important 
opportunity for future and in particular qualitative case-based research to investigate 
implications of a dynamic perspective. We suggest two aspects to be particularly relevant: 
First, what happens if a firm grows? Would a small firm, characterized by a communication 
gap, lessen this gap over time, with or without transforming it into an implementation gap as 
the firm grows? In other words, would existing internal implementation of CSR practices 
remain unchanged or would increasing organizational costs lead to an abandonment of 
existing practices, in favor of more comprehensive communication that might arguably 
correspond with implementation? A path dependency perspective (e.g., Sydow, Schreyögg, & 
Koch, 2009) represents an interesting starting point for further inquiry, as it would suggest 
that existing patterns, for instance strong implementation, would be less likely to change over 
time, compared to activities that are new to the firm, e.g. communication. Future research 
should address the question of what happens if costs grow (or decrease), for communication 
as well as implementation. For instance, smaller firms might face higher communication 
requirements when supplying large firms that expect formal reporting standards about the 
small firm’s CSR activities, while learning effects may reduce costs in either small or large 
firms over time. Moreover, probable patterns of CSR engagement in micro- and medium-
sized firms remain quite under-researched, i.e. those firms which can be neither characterized 
with small firm nor large firm organizational characteristics or that represent both 
characteristics of small and large firms to varying degrees. With this in mind, we deem it 
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important to approach the question of whether there is an “optimal” organizational size that 
makes it least likely for a firm to have neither a CSR implementation nor a CSR 
communication gap, given that both large firms “walking the talk” and small firms “talking 
the walk” is a socially desirable outcome. 
Second, is an implementation or communication gap sustainable over time? A firm 
that maintains a considerable implementation gap over a longer period might be more 
vulnerable to public criticism and be accused of an unsubstantiated façade of CSR that 
undermines credibility with internal and external stakeholders of the organization. Employees 
might feel deceived by their employer when working for an apparently socially responsible 
firm that in reality is not. In such cases, decoupled CSR communication may provoke 
corrective action that could lead to full implementation of corresponding practices simply 
because most employees would refuse to see themselves as only “ceremonial props” 
(Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2008: 88). Studies have emphasized the idea of “self-entrapment” 
(e.g., Haack et al., 2012) that was initially put forward in the political sciences (see Risse, 
1999). Scholars have argued that when firms make continuous aspirational commitments 
about CSR and communicate them, over time they effectively may talk their CSR 
communication into existence in terms of actual implementation (Christensen, Morsing, & 
Thyssen, 2013). In addition, external stakeholders such as NGOs might even be more inclined 
to start campaigning against a firm which they judge as particularly hypocritical, i.e. the 
higher the publicly perceived implementation gap, the more likely it is for that organization to 
become the target of boycotts or campaigns, and the higher the cost of not implementing CSR.  
Research based on CSR-related organizational costs should therefore take into account 
the opportunity cost of not engaging in CSR communication or implementation. For large 
firms with an extensive implementation gap, this might result in high ex-post costs, for 
instance to repair reputation caused by consumer boycotts or negative NGO-led campaigns. 
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The respective cost implications, however, remain quite unclear. For smaller firms, there 
might be opportunity costs for not engaging in communication, if for instance large 
international buyers that increasingly require some sort of CSR standards from their suppliers 
might not award contracts or even de-list small firms that resist formally communicating their 
CSR activities.  
 
LIMITATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
We acknowledge some limitations to our conceptual model. A critique of our explanation for 
the suggested differences in CSR implementation and communication between small and 
large firms is the existence of deviant cases. There are, of course, large firms that issue 
comprehensive CSR reports and over time have substantially implemented CSR in their 
organizational processes and procedures (Baumann-Pauly & Scherer, 2012; Spence & 
Bourlakis, 2009).  
Likewise, some small firms have not only implemented procedures, but also 
communicate to the public about their CSR activities (Nielsen & Thomsen, 2009). It should 
be noted that small firms are not a homogenous group, and may not all fit the standard form 
we have presented here. Some small firms may neither be familiar with the CSR concept nor 
have considered how to integrate CSR into core business routines despite their favorable 
organizational conditions (Murillo & Lozano, 2006). They may deny any sort of social 
responsibility particularly if operating in the informal economy prior to establishing a viable 
business. Furthermore, for reasons of parsimony, we only compared smaller firms relative to 
larger firms and in doing so assumed a size differential of for instance 250 employees versus 
10,000, and did not further distinguish micro, medium-sized, or very large firms, as 
mentioned earlier.  
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Also, we excluded the potential influence of differing industrial sectors and cultural or 
economic environments in our analysis (see Matten & Moon, 2008). These limitations need to 
be taken into account when seeking to make our theoretical framework more robust and when 
empirically addressing the open questions we have raised. Nevertheless, we suggest that the 
considerable evidence we have sketched to support our theoretical arguments points to these 
highly representative patterns of CSR engagement and applies to the majority of small and 
large firms.  
Overall, the model that we have sketched in this study seeks to contribute to size-
aware and comparative research in CSR. A focus on organizational costs, rather than benefits, 
for implementing versus communicating CSR provides a new and potentially more robust 
dimension for further exploring variation in how firms engage in CSR. 
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ENDNOTES 
1 In this study, we do not differentiate between the popular notions of SME (small- and 
medium-sized enterprise; a company with fewer than 250 employees) versus MNC 
(multinational corporation with several thousand employees and global operations). Instead, 
smaller vs. larger firms are the two opposing or extreme poles and different size, in number of 
employees, of one organization is seen as relative to the size of another organization (see 
Kimberly, 1976). 
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TABLES 
TABLE 1 
Summary of primary and secondary organizational characteristics and cost implications 
 
Primary Organizational 
Characteristics / Firm Size 
Smaller Firm  Larger Firm  
Horizontal Differentiation low high 
Vertical Differentiation low high 
Specialization low high 
Formalization low high 
Identity Consistency high low 
Secondary Characteristics /  
Firm Size 
Smaller Firm 
Costs 
Larger Firm 
Costs 
Control Costs low high 
Coordination Costs low high 
Communication Costs low high 
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FIGURES 
FIGURE 1 
Firm size and CSR engagement. Note: Thick arrows indicate relatively extensive 
communication (large firms)/implementation (small firms); thin arrows indicate relatively 
little communication (small firms)/implementation (large firms) of CSR. Source: Own 
illustration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2 
Large firm 
Small firm 
Independent variable 
CSR 
communication 
CSR 
implementation 
Dependent variable 
Firm Size CSR engagement Size-dependent  organizational characteristics 
Moderator: Cost-
implications 
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Relative Organizational Cost of Engagement in CSR (as relative share in total firm cost for 
CSR implementation and communication). Black: Relative cost of CSR communication; 
dotted: Relative organizational cost for CSR implementation.  
Source: Own illustration 
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